


Institutional Economic and Market Update

Fourth Quarter 2022




The Rorschach Economy: CFO Confidence



- ► The Bad: CFO confidence about the economy is at near-recessionary levels.
- ► The Good: CFO confidence about their own businesses remains buoyant potentially signaling less belt tightening to come.



The Rorschach Economy: Financial Conditions



- ▶ The Bad: 2022 has seen a sharp tightening of financial conditions, consistent with past recessions.
- ► The Good: Financial conditions have only recently moved into restrictive territory and are not yet at levels associated with past recessions.




U.S. Recession Risk Indicators

- 12 variables have historically foreshadowed a looming recession
- The overall dashboard is currently signaling recession

	Sept. 30, 2022	August 31, 2022	July 31, 2022
Housing Permits	•	†	•
Job Sentiment	†	1	•
Job Sentiment Jobless Claims Retail Sales	†	1	•
Retail Sales	×	×	×
Wage Growth	×	×	×
Commodities	×	×	×
ISM New Orders Profit Margins	×	•	•
Profit Margins	•	1	•
Truck Shipments	1	1	•
Credit Spreads	×	×	×
Money Supply	×	×	•
Yield Curve	•	•	•
Overall Signal	×	×	•
	★ Expansion	Caution X Recession	



Don't Make the Same Mistake Twice




			Core Consume	r Price Index YoY P	Unemploy	ment Rate	
	Overall Recession Signal	Total Fed Rate Cut	Fed Pivot (or Current)	+12 Months	+36 Months	Fed Pivot (or Current)	Labor Market
December 1966	×	-2.0%	3.3%	3.8%	6.2%	3.8%	Tight
September 1984	•	-5.8%	5.1%	4.0%	4.3%	7.3%	Excess
July 1995		-0.8%	3.0%	2.7%	2.2%	5.7%	Slack
Current			6.6%			3.5%	

- ▶ There have been 13 primary Fed tightening cycles historically, with 10 ending in a recession and 3 soft landings.
- With a tight labor market today similar to 1966, the Fed is likely wary of pivoting too early which could give way to a reacceleration of inflation.




Getting Back to Target



With inflation at such elevated levels, a moderation in the pace moving forward would still mean a lengthy glidepath back to the Fed's 2% target.




Not Just a Goods Problem Anymore



- ▶ What started as a story of excess goods inflation has broadened into a story of excess everything inflation.
- ► Core services excluding housing (OER) is running substantially above the Fed's 2% target on its own.



Credibility: Bruised, not Broken



- ► Following a spike to 6%, 1-year inflation swaps have normalized and are nearing pre-pandemic levels.
- ▶ This suggests investors continue to believe that the Fed will bring inflation under control over the intermediate term.



Data as of Oct. 13, 2022. Source: Bloomberg.


Leading Indicators Point to Recession



- ► Historical declines in the Leading Economic Indicators lasting more than several months have foreshadowed economic downturns.
- ▶ The Leading Economic Indicators have been declining for the last 6 months.




What's The Fed Telling Us?



- ► Historically, an increase of 0.5% (or more) in the unemployment rate vs. the lows over the prior year has signaled a recession (the Sahm rule).
- ▶ The Fed dots signal an expected 0.9% increase in the unemployment rate next year.




Housing is the Business Cycle



- ▶ The National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) survey tends to lead the unemployment rate by 12 months.
- ▶ Should the historical relationship hold, unemployment is likely to rise in the coming year.




Are Consumers Less Sensitive to Interest Rates?



▶ With household leverage near 50-year lows, the impact of higher rates may be blunted.




The Immaculate Slackening



- Last month, job openings dropped by over one million, re-invigorating hope that the labor market can loosen without a substantial rise in unemployment.
- ▶ Historically, the two series have moved opposite to one another, but the current cycle bears little resemblance to history.



The "Margin" for Error




- Profit margins have typically peaked three years ahead of recessions.
- Labor has been the scarcest resource of the recovery, meaning businesses may opt to keep workers on the books with margins still near record levels.



14

Canary in the Economic Coal Mine?




- ► Following a rise in initial jobless claims from 53-year lows, claims have rolled over indicating the labor market remains healthy.
- Initial jobless claims have been one of the best high-frequency indicators on the ClearBridge Recession Risk dashboard, making them particularly insightful into the health of this expansion.



Data as of Oct. 7, 2022. Source: Bloomberg, BLS.

Are We There Yet?





▶ Since World War II, the average recessionary selloff has been -29.9%, a level the current selloff is approaching but has not yet reached.



Cart Before the Horse?

Recession Start	Recession End	Length (Months)	Market Low During Recession?	Distance from Recession Start (Months)	Distance from Recession End (Months)
Nov. 1948	Oct. 1949	11	Yes	6	-5
July 1953	May 1954	10	Yes	1	-9
Aug. 1957	April 1958	8	Yes	2	-6
April 1960	Feb. 1961	10	Yes	6	-4
Dec. 1969	Nov. 1970	11	Yes	5	-6
Nov. 1973	March 1975	16	Yes	10	-6
Jan. 1980	July 1980	6	Yes	2	-4
July 1981	Nov. 1982	16	Yes	12	-4
July 1990	March 1991	8	Yes	2	-6
March 2001	Nov. 2001	8	No	18	10
Dec. 2007	June 2009	18	Yes	14	-4
Feb. 2020	April 2020	2	Yes	1	-1
Average:		10.3		6.6	-3.8

- ► Historically, market lows have come around the 2/3 mark during recessions.
- ▶ The strength of the labor market would suggest this point is not yet on the immediate horizon.



Investor Sentiment Historically Bearish

S&P	500	Forward	Return
-----	-----	----------------	--------

		000.000.001	
Date	AAII % (Bulls less % Bears)	1-Month	3-Month
Oct. 19, 1990	-54.0%	2.2%	6.3%
Mar. 5, 2009	-51.4%	23.4%	37.7%
Oct. 5, 1990	-44.0%	1.0%	3.0%
Sept. 22, 2022	-43.1%	?	?
Sept. 21, 1990	-43.0%	0.4%	6.6%
Nov. 16, 1990	-43.0%	3.1%	16.4%
April 28, 2022	-42.9%	-3.0%	-5.0%
June 23, 2022	-41.1%	4.4%	-2.7%
Aug. 17, 1990	-41.0%	-3.1%	-3.3%
Sept. 29, 2022	-40.9%	?	?
Jan. 10, 2008	-39.3%	-6.3%	-4.2%
June 16, 2022	-38.9%	5.4%	5.6%
Average:		2.7%	6.0%

- Investor sentiment as measured by the AAII Bull/Bear survey has reached the 4th worst reading in history.
- Similar past extreme readings have typically preceded short-term bounces in equity markets.



Presidential Cycle Tailwind?




► Following the toughest stretch of the Presidential Cycle, U.S. equities are now entering a period that has historically delivered several quarters of superior returns.



Finding Fair Value





- ▶ Although U.S. equities have derated from greater than 21x, they are still well above the average multiple seen at prior bear market troughs.
- ► Over the last 20 years, major market lows have tended to occur at loftier valuations (14.4x) relative to history, perhaps a function of lower (discount) rates.



What's the Path for Earnings?


NTM EPS Behavior

Market Peak	EPS Peak	# of Days	Market Trough	EPS Trough	# of Days	EPS Peak – Trough	Market Peak – Trough
			Rec	essions			
3/24/2000	8/7/2000	136	10/9/2002	12/17/2001	-296	-17.5%	-49.1%
10/9/2007	11/1/2007	23	3/9/2009	5/8/2009	60	-39.3%	-56.8%
2/19/2020	1/30/2020	-20	3/23/2020	5/15/2020	53	-20.6%	-33.9%
Average GD	P Recession:	46			-61	-25.8%	-46.6%
		·	Non-Recessio	nary EPS Declin	es		
7/17/1998	9/29/1998	74	8/31/1998	1/4/1999	126	-2.6%	-19.3%
5/21/2014	10/7/2014	139	8/25/2015	2/6/2015	-200	-5.5%	-7.2%
11/3/2015	9/8/2015	-56	2/1/2016	3/1/2016	29	-3.2%	-13.3%
9/20/2018	12/6/2018	77	12/24/2018	2/1/2019	39	-2.3%	-19.8%
Average GD	P Recession:	59			-2	-3.4%	-14.9%
		'	Cu	rrent*		·	
1/3/2022	7/12/2022	190	10/12/2022	10/11/2022	-1	-1.5%	-25.4%

- **Earnings revisions have declined by -26% on average across the last three recessions.**
- ► It is not uncommon for earnings estimates to bottom after market lows have occurred. Earnings estimates have only recently started to come down.




Earnings Revisions During the Global Financial Crisis



- Earnings had only been revised lower by 4% from peak at the time of the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008.
- ► Earnings expectations continued to drift lower past the March 2009 market lows.
- ▶ By the time earnings troughed in May, the market had already climbed 37% from the lows.



ISM Manufacturing Survey Leads Earnings



- ► The ISM Manufacturing PMI tends to be a leading indicator of economic (and earnings) activity.
- ▶ With PMIs in a downtrend over the last year, earnings momentum appears poised to decelerate.



Tighter Fed → Lower PMI → Higher Recession Risk

Fed Tightening, S&P 500 Drawdowns, PMIs and Recessions

	_				
% Decline	PMI Low Date	PMI Level	Historical Decile	Fed Tightening	Recession
-21.6%	Jan. 1958	33.4	1 st	Yes	Yes
-28.0%	Aug. 1962	49.5	3rd	Yes	No
-22.2%	Apr. 1967	42.8	1 st	Yes	No
-36.1%	Nov. 1970	39.7	1 st	Yes	Yes
-48.2%	Jan. 1975	30.7	1 st	Yes	Yes
-27.1%	May. 1982	35.5	1 st	Yes	Yes
-33.5%	Dec. 1986	50.5	4 th	No	No
-49.1%	Oct. 2001	40.8	1 st	Yes	Yes
-56.8%	Dec. 2008	34.5	1 st	Yes	Yes
-33.9%	Apr. 2020	41.6	1 st	Yes	Yes
-35.7%		39.9	8/10	9/10	7/10
	-21.6% -28.0% -22.2% -36.1% -48.2% -27.1% -33.5% -49.1% -56.8% -33.9%	-21.6% Jan. 1958 -28.0% Aug. 1962 -22.2% Apr. 1967 -36.1% Nov. 1970 -48.2% Jan. 1975 -27.1% May. 1982 -33.5% Dec. 1986 -49.1% Oct. 2001 -56.8% Dec. 2008 -33.9% Apr. 2020	### Level -21.6% Jan. 1958 33.4 -28.0% Aug. 1962 49.5 -22.2% Apr. 1967 42.8 -36.1% Nov. 1970 39.7 -48.2% Jan. 1975 30.7 -27.1% May. 1982 35.5 -33.5% Dec. 1986 50.5 -49.1% Oct. 2001 40.8 -56.8% Dec. 2008 34.5 -33.9% Apr. 2020 41.6	% Decline PMI Low Date Level Historical Decile -21.6% Jan. 1958 33.4 1st -28.0% Aug. 1962 49.5 3rd -22.2% Apr. 1967 42.8 1st -36.1% Nov. 1970 39.7 1st -48.2% Jan. 1975 30.7 1st -27.1% May. 1982 35.5 1st -33.5% Dec. 1986 50.5 4th -49.1% Oct. 2001 40.8 1st -56.8% Dec. 2008 34.5 1st -33.9% Apr. 2020 41.6 1st	Level

- Fed tightening has preceded 10 of the last 11 bear markets.
- ▶ PMIs tend to be a leading indicator of economic activity, and have often bottomed in the 1st decile following Fed tightening. This has often led to a recession.



Dollar Headwind to Earnings




► The U.S. dollar has risen 15% YTD, a considerable headwind to the 40% of S&P 500 revenues generated outside the United States.



ISM Tied to Equity Leadership

PMI Tied to Equity Leadership




With the economy slowing and Fed policy tightening, ISM manufacturing PMI is likely to decline in the coming months. Historically, this has been linked with more defensive market leadership.



ISM Tied to Equity Leadership

S&P 500 NTM%Δ by ISM Manufacturing Regime



Sector Performance During Falling ISM Regimes

		High	Medium	Low	All
. 1	Utilities	13.6	3.8	-0.2	7.7
nsive	Health Care	4.6	9.2	13.4	7.5
Defensive	Consumer Staples	3.3	5.9	16.0	5.3
٦	Real Estate	9.3	-1.4	-19.6	3.0
	Consumer Discretionary	-0.9	3.0	8.7	1.6
	Information Technology	-0.1	2.7	-5.3	1.1
	Energy	11.4	-6.0	1.8	1.7
	Industrials	-0.1	-2.0	-3.7	-1.3
Cyclical	Financials	-1.7	-1.9	-9.1	-2.2
Cycl	Communication Services	-5.9	0.3	1.3	-2.2
•	Materials	-4.8	-5.8	8.0	-4.7
	S&P 500	3.0	0.8	-11.1	1.3

During periods of declining ISM manufacturing PMI, defensive and growth sectors tend to outperform. This has historically been the case irrespective of the starting point for the ISM manufacturing PMI.



Paradigm Shift?



▶ The recent market selloff did not witness the typical leadership from the past 17 years with smaller caps and value holding up better than larger caps and growth.



*Most recent drawdown reflects the 2022 Peak-Trough from market close on Jan. 3 to Sept. 30, 2022. Data as of Sept. 30, 2022. Note: Average performance during selloffs of 5% of more. Benchmarks used: Large Value: Russell 1000 Value, Large Blend: Russell 1000, Large Growth: Russell 1000 Growth; Mid Value: Russell Mid Cap Value, Mid Blend: Russell Mid Cap, Mid Growth: Russell Mid Cap Growth; Small Value: Russell 2000 Value, Small Blend: Russell 2000, Small Growth: Russell 2000 Growth. Source: Russell and Bloomberg. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results. Investors cannot invest directly in an index, and unmanaged index returns do not reflect any fees, expenses or sales charges.


Drawdown by Sector/Industry

	Max Drawdowns Around Recessionary Bear Markets						
	1990	2001	2007-9	2020	Avg	Current	
Food Retail	-21.4	-38.6	-34.5	-16.0	-27.6	-25.6	
Staples	-17.1	-34.2	-34.8	-24.7	-27.7	-17.7	
H-Hold & Pers Prod	-19.6	-37.6	-40.4	-22.5	-30.0	-26.3	
Food, Bev, & Tob	-16.8	-39.3	-35.5	-31.1	-30.7	-14.0	
Pharma & Biotech	-16.5	-46.7	-36.7	-23.2	-30.7	-13.6	
Health Care	-16.5	-42.3	-40.7	-28.6	-32.0	-16.3	
HC Equip & Svcs	-16.7	-34.7	-50.1	-35.2	-34.2	-20.7	
Transport	-28.3	-36.8	-55.9	-38.4	-39.9	-28.3	
Retail	-35.5	-36.8	-59.6	-27.6	-39.9	-37.7	
S&P 500	-19.9	-49.1	-56.8	-33.9	-39.9	-25.4	
Utilities	-11.8	-64.5	-49.2	-36.6	-40.5	-20.9	
Materials	-24.8	-38.6	-62.1	-37.4	-40.7	-25.6	
Energy	-15.1	-35.7	-54.4	-61.1	-41.6	-37.6	
Comm & Prof Svcs	-31.0	-38.4	-60.6	-37.0	-41.7	-22.2	
Cons Svcs	-38.6	-36.2	-44.6	-49.0	-42.1	-28.8	
Discretionary	-31.6	-44.5	-60.3	-32.5	-42.2	-37.1	
Comm Svcs	-22.6	-76.2	-51.1	-28.6	-44.6	-42.3	
Industrials	-28.1	-45.7	-65.2	-42.6	-45.4	-22.6	
Durables & Apparel	-29.6	-38.1	-68.7	-47.3	-45.9	-46.7	
Media	-28.4	-63.9	-65.2	-30.4	-47.0	-44.8	
Real Estate	-	-26.4	-75.7	-38.9	-47.0	-34.4	
Telecom	-22.6	-76.2	-51.1	-39.4	-47.3	-27.3	
Capital Goods	-27.7	-49.5	-68.6	-44.9	-47.7	-22.4	
Insurance	-31.9	-41.4	-81.2	-43.8	-49.6	-16.5	
Software	-47.0	-70.8	-53.9	-27.9	-49.9	-38.2	
Technology	-31.3	-82.5	-55.0	-31.2	-50.0	-34.3	
Hardware	-30.7	-85.8	-54.3	-32.3	-50.8	-28.8	
Financials	-39.4	-38.3	-83.4	-43.1	-51.1	-27.0	
Diversified Fin	-40.0	-49.9	-83.6	-38.5	-53.0	-26.5	
Banks	-46.8	-29.3	-87.5	-49.8	-53.4	-36.7	
Semiconductors	-41.6	-84.4	-61.8	-35.1	-55.7	-47.9	
Auto	-38.1	-57.4	-85.6	-56.2	-59.3	-47.5	

► Traditional defensive sectors such as Staples, Health Care, and Utilities have historically held up better during past recessionary bear markets.



Canary in the Market Coalmine?



- Long-term inflation expectations have remained remarkably steady through a volatile period of elevated inflation and aggressive Fed tightening.
- ► Should market expectations break meaningfully lower (<2%) the Fed may feel more comfortable backing off from the currently expected monetary policy path.



Biographies

Name and Posit	tion	Industry Experience	ClearBridge Tenure	Education, Experience and Professional Designations
	Josh Jamner CFA Vice President, Investment Strategy Analyst	13 years	• Joined ClearBridge in 2017	 Member of the CFA Institute RBC Capital Markets - Assistant Vice President, Associate Strategist - U.S. Equity Bessemer Trust - Assistant Vice President, Client Portfolio Analyst BA in Government from Colby College
	Jeffrey Schulze CFA Director, Investment Strategist	17 years	• Joined ClearBridge in 2014	 Member of the CFA Institute Lord Abbett & Co., LLC – Portfolio Specialist BS in Finance from Rutgers University



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